Mon-Tue, August 29-30, 2016
Formal languages have been advanced by philosophers as vehicles of expression that facilitate rigour in science. The aim of this workshop will be to shed light on the relation between formal languages and what they are used to express. Do they express the same thoughts expressed by natural language, in a more precise way (Frege)? Are they a means for explicating concepts (Carnap)? What, if anything, makes a formal framework more correct than another? Given that mathematics and science are not normally carried out in fully formalised languages, despite their abundance in the past century, what is the value of these languages?
All talks will take place at the Edelstein Center, Levy Building, Edmond Safra Campus, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Monday, August 29, 2016
10:00-11:15 Luis Rosa (MCMP, LMU Munich): Reliable reasoning in natural language
11:15-11:45 Coffee break
11:45-13:00 Giulia Felappi (Southampton): Validity, truth content and how content is reached
13:00-15:00 Lunch break
15:00-16:15 Andrea Iacona (Turin): On the hypothesis that distinct names denote distinct objects
16:15-16:45 Coffee break
19:00 Workshop dinner
Tuesday, August 30, 2016
10:00-11:15 Ori Simchen (University of British Columbia): On conflating the representation and the represented
11:15-11:30 Coffee break
11:30-12:45 Gil Sagi (MCMP, LMU Munich; Edelstein): Some general considerations on logic and natural language
12:45-14:00 Lunch break
14:00-15:15 David Kashtan (Hebrew University): Material adequacy
AbstractsGiulia Felappi (Southampton): Validity, truth content and how content is reached
The notion of validity is usually spelled out in terms of necessary preservation of truth: an argument is said to be valid if there is no possible situation in which its premises are all true and its conclusion is not true. But not everybody agrees that truth really is the central and unique notion that matters in defining validity. In my talk, I will discuss some prima facie counterexamples to validity as preservation of truth with the aim of understanding what else, if not merely truth, validity should be concerned with.
Andrea Iacona (Turin): On the hypothesis that distinct names denote distinct objects
This paper focuses on the hypothesis that distinct names denote distinct objects, which was entertained by Russell and Wittgenstein as part of their conception of a logically perfect language. Some foregone objections to this hypothesis will be considered, in order to show that none of them resists scrutiny. As far as we know, no compelling reason has ever been offered against it.
Luis Rosa (MCMP, LMU Munich): Reliable reasoning in natural language
It is relatively easy to say when reasoning in formal languages is reliable, e.g. using model-theoretic semantics. But whatever we say to that effect will be concerned with an artificial notion of reliability in reasoning (basically there is a big difference between truth and truth-in-a-
Ori Simchen (University of British Columbia): On conflating the representation and the represented
A prevalent post-linguistic-turn tendency in philosophy is to regard formal semantic analyses as metaphysically revealing with respect to the facts conveyed by our sentences. I illustrate this general tendency in several areas – numbers, de re modality, cognitive attitudes – before turning to structured propositions. I argue that problems besetting structured propositions offer a compelling reason to regard them under an instrumentalist attitude as merely representing whatever they are adduced to explain (what is said; what is believed, hoped, feared, etc.; what is true or false; what is necessary, contingent, impossible, etc.) rather than realities in their own right underlying the relevant phenomena. I conclude by offering a conjecture as to the origins of the aforementioned tendency.
Gil Sagi (MCMP, LMU Munich; Edelstein): Some general considerations on logic and natural language
Most of the contemporary research in logic is carried out with respect to formal, mathematical, languages. Logic, however, is said to be concerned with correct reasoning, and it is natural language that we usually reason in. Can logic keep its promise in the realm where its motivation originates? On the one hand, we have formal semanticists who study the logic of natural language, assuming it exists. On the other hand, some philosophers have denied that there is a logical consequence relation in natural language. In this talk I will look at the relation between logic and natural language from the most general perspective, assuming about either as little as possible. I will draw from the works of Frege, Carnap, Chomsky, Glanzberg, Steinberger and others.
For inquiries, please contact Gil Sagi: Gil.Sagi@lrz.uni-